



Xenophanes of Colophon and the Problem of Distinguishing Between Skepticism and Negative Dogmatism

Dariusz Kubok
University of Silesia in Katowice
dariusz.kubok@us.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: Sextus Empiricus in *Pyr.* (I, 224, cf Diog. IX, 18) describes Xenophanes of Colophon as *hupatuphos*, which is to mean that he was a skeptic who did not entirely free himself of dogmatic assertions. In this paper I will try to demonstrate an alternative way of understanding *hupatuphos* in relation to Xenophanes. In my opinion, the interpretation according to which passages can be found in Xenophanes' writings expressing both a skeptical and negative dogmatic position is possible. Thus, this thinker may be described with the adjective *hupatuphos* not because he did not manage to free himself of positive dogmatism, but rather because he did not free himself of negative dogmatism.

KEY-WORDS: skepticism, dogmatism, knowledge, truth, opinion, Xenophanes of Colophon

In his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (PH I, 224, cf Diog. IX, 18), Sextus Empiricus invokes the opinion of Timon of Phlius describing Xenophanes of Colophon as *hupatuphos* ("not entirely free of *tuphos*,"¹ "partly free of conceit,"² "semi-free of

¹ Leshner (1992) 215, n. 53.

² Leshner (1992) 215.

vanity"³), referring to the fact that both dogmatic and skeptical elements can be found in his views. Among the dogmatic elements are the belief that everything is one and the passages implying the existence of a positive (constructive) theology. Based on Sextus' opinion some scholars see conflict in Xenophanes' philosophy between positive dogmatic theology and skepticism.⁴ In this article, I will try to show that it is possible to seriously weaken this conflict, if not to do away with it entirely, and that an epistemological reading of Xenophanes may lead to more fruitful conclusions.

To begin with, three types of philosophy should be distinguished following the typology proposed by Sextus Empiricus (*PH* I, 1-4): dogmatic philosophy (the truth is possessed by those who know), Academic philosophy (the truth cannot be discovered), and skeptical (zetetical) philosophy, which is expressed through a permanent search for truth. On the basis of this distinction philosophy can be divided into three basic positions: positive dogmatism (PD), negative dogmatism (ND), and skepticism (S).⁵ Fragment D-K 21B34⁶ of Xenophanes, which for many scholars is an expression of skepticism (S), is in fact a manifestation of negative dogmatism (ND), at least lines 1-4, with the exception of the last sentence. In my opinion, the crucial problem with an exegesis of Xenophanes' views is not the conflict between positive theology and skepticism,⁷ but rather the epistemological

³ Hankinson (1995) 322, ch. IV, n. 3.

⁴ See, for example: Döring (1900) 289; Zeller (1963) 674-675; Gigon (1968) 178; Wiesner (1997) 24.

⁵ I would like to note that I will be using this typology in the following article only as a general model for distinguishing three basic philosophical positions in order to place Xenophanes' own views within their context. It goes without saying that I am leaving aside the debate concerning the application of PD, ND, and S to the views of the Pyrrhonists and Academics. At the same time, I am aware that a historically later typology is currently used to analyze Xenophanes' views - a typology tainted with long philosophical debates. However, it seems that such a procedure will allow for a more precise look at the views of the thinker from Colophon, or at least contribute to an analysis of the sources of skeptic reflection. Such an exegetic procedure is used by many scholars. For example, R. Bett asserts that from the perspective of Sextus' terminology, "Pyrrho would qualify as a 'dogmatist' rather than as a sceptic." Bett (2003) 4. See also Svavarsson (2010) 36-57, Svavarsson (2002) 248-256, Lesses (2002) 255-271.

⁶ Except where noted to the contrary, the Greek text of the passages is taken from *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Griechisch und Deutsch von H. Diels, herausgeg. von W. Kranz, Bd. 1 – 3, Zürich 1985, hereafter cited as D-K.

⁷ I generally agree with John Philippoussis, who writes: "Yet, it seems, Xenophanes' primary concern is neither the *natura deorum* nor the *natura rerum*. His foremost consideration is not the cosmological question *per se* (whether divine or physical world), but the gnoseological question regarding epistemic certainty and its ontic reference that both his predecessors and his immediate posterity took for granted." Philippoussis (1989) 327.

question associated with the presence of both skeptical (e.g. fragment D-K 21B18) and negative dogmatic elements in these views.

It is worth noting that presently, skepticism is understood as a position asserting that knowledge does not exist or (modally) that knowledge is not possible, and thus corresponds to the position described above as negative dogmatism. Moreover, skepticism may appear as a thesis in first-order language, and in second-order language (at the meta-level) as the theses: we do not know if we know anything, and (modally) we cannot know if we know anything. Thus, a distinction exists between skeptical objective (epistemic) and skeptical meta-objective (epistemological) theses, the latter concerning the possibility of attaining knowledge of our cognition of things. Of course, the above theses are global in nature, as they concern knowledge and its nature as a whole. Local skepticism (concerning only a certain class of statements) is possible as well, and like global skepticism may appear in both a strong and weak version, with the strong version concerning epistemically-justified beliefs and the weak version concerning knowledge. The key is not to mechanically impose modern understandings of skepticism on ancient Greek thought, but instead to distinguish between S and ND to the highest degree possible. For example, M. Frede distinguishes between "dogmatic skepticism" and "classical skepticism" in order to defend the coherency of the views of ancient skeptics.⁸ R.J. Hankinson, on the other hand, distinguishes between the ontological and epistemological forms of positive dogmatism, negative dogmatism, and genuine skepticism.⁹ In the following article, I will use the terms positive dogmatism (PD), negative dogmatism (ND), and skepticism (S) in the sense corresponding to the most general division of philosophers proposed by Sextus Empiricus into Dogmatists, Academics, and Skeptics. I am only interested in the possibility of applying these categories to Xenophanes' views *ex post*, not in reflecting on the groundedness of this division regarding the skeptic tradition, nor in an exegesis of the interpretation of skeptic thought conducted by Sextus Empiricus. In connection with this, my initial premises are that PD declares that truth can be discovered as a result of

⁸ Frede (1997) 127-151.

⁹ Hankinson (1995) ch. II.

investigation, ND - that it cannot be discovered,¹⁰ while S is a negation of dogmatism as a whole, both in its positive and negative forms.¹¹ In accordance with the S view, the idea that truth can be discovered is neither confirmed nor denied. Thus, skeptics continuously seek the truth (zeteticism), while avoiding final dogmatic declarations as to whether it can or cannot be found. On the basis of this outline, I accept that one cannot be both a dogmatist and skeptic simultaneously, which does not mean that this cannot occur in light of other interpretations.¹² Since S is a negation of both PD and ND, the phrase "dogmatic skepticism" seems to be a contradiction in light of the division created by Sextus, though such a position has been (consciously or unconsciously) advocated by certain philosophers. This issue must be analyzed in light of the extant fragments of Xenophanes' works.

It is worth noting that the principal category upon which the division of philosophy proposed by Sextus is built is that of investigation.¹³ Therefore, we can say that (1) the distinguished types of philosophy are binding only for those, who seek the truth, while (2) what is sought is limited to what is sought by philosophers. From (1) it follows that we can speak of a possible discovery of truth (PD) or assertion of the impossibility of its discovery (ND) only after truth has been sought. This seems to exclude the possibility of a chance discovery of truth, or at least such a chance discovery that was not preceded by investigation. From (2), on the other hand, it follows that we are not speaking of just any sort of search for anything, but of a philosophical search (in the methodological sense) for what constitutes the aim

¹⁰ It would be more precise to say that PD declares that at least one truth can be discovered, while ND declares that no truth can be discovered. Such a characterization of PD is formulated by Sextus Empiricus (*PH* I, 223), and it is worth noting that this passage precedes his comments on Xenophanes, including the one in which he describes Xenophanes as *ὑπάτυφος*. Sextus writes: "ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἑνὸς δογματίζων, ἢ προκρίνων φαντασίαν φαντασίας ὅλως κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν <ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος> περὶ τινος τῶν ἀδήλων, τοῦ δογματικοῦ γίνεται χαρακτηῖρος [...]" *PH* I, 223. See also: Woleński (2013) 267-275.

¹¹ This does not mean that S is free from all premises and presuppositions. If a skeptic continuously seeks truth, he must presuppose some form of its existence, though he distances himself from assertions as to whether or not it can be discovered. If the skeptic had initially presupposed that there was no truth, seeking it would not make sense; instead, he would immediately presuppose ND. Knowledge (solutions) must not be confused with the presuppositions that make knowledge possible.

¹² See J. Barnes' reflections on Sextus' typology, in which he demonstrates such possibilities. Barnes (2007).

¹³ "Τοῖς ζητοῦσι τι πράγμα ἢ εὕρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὐρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως. διόπερ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὐρηκέναι τὸ ἀληθές ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφάναντο μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν." *PH* I, 1-3.

of philosophers' efforts, i.e. truth. Thus, the types of philosophy distinguished are subordinated to philosophical investigation, i.e. to philosophical zeteticism. What distinguishes the three types is how they view the relationship between investigation and discovery as regards truth. PD asserts that truth has been discovered as a result of investigation, ND - that truth cannot be discovered as a result of investigation,¹⁴ while S continues the search for truth.¹⁵ Philosophy, understood at its source as S, is a continuing investigation, an incessant search; such a description of S, however, may be in conflict with another name for skepticism mentioned by Sextus (*PH* I, 7) stemming from the word *ephektikē* (suspensive), whose passive aspect is expressed as *pathos*. Effecticism thus understood may suggest that the investigation has been concluded, which would contradict the essence of S as a permanent search.¹⁶ Moreover, effecticism in this form would be closer to ND.¹⁷ In such a case, we could not say that ND stands in opposition to S, which would taint the logical purity of the division into PD, ND, and S based on *PH* I, 1-4. It is also worth noting that Greek skepticism is often understood (in the modern spirit) as a combination of ND and S, i.e. as the conviction that truth is continuously

¹⁴ It is worth noting here that in light of Sextus' comments, Academic philosophy (negative dogmatism) asserts the impossibility of discovering truth as a result of investigation. Dogmatism, both in its positive and negative versions, appears only as a result of prior investigation. Such an understanding of ND differs significantly from other possible understandings of ND, which presuppose the impossibility of grasping truth *a priori* (without investigation).

¹⁵ This division may also be presented metaphorically as a journey (indeed, the favored symbol of philosophy as a search is a path) towards truth. A positive dogmatist supposes that he has reached the end of the path (found the truth) after investigating, a negative dogmatist asserts that after investigating he has come to the conclusion that he can go no further, as the truth cannot be reached, while a skeptic continues searching for the truth (continues his journey) without asserting either that the truth can be cognized (that the path has an end in the future) or that the truth cannot be found (that the path is endless). If we accept that philosophy is a journey, then both forms of dogmatism are connected with stopping the journey. PD presupposes stopping (finding truth) due to reaching what they consider the end of the journey, ND - stopping (the assertion that truth cannot be discovered) due to the fact that reaching the end of the journey is deemed impossible. It is worth noting that the Greek word "σκεπτικός" is usually translated as "skeptical," while J. Barnes proposes it be translated as "inquisitive," thus emphasizing that "a sceptic [...] is first and foremost a philosopher." Barnes (2007) 325.

¹⁶ See Barnes (2007) 327. Effecticism can alternatively be interpreted not as the cessation of investigation, but rather as refraining from final judgments.

¹⁷ In the introduction to his *Vitae Philosophorum* (I, 16), Diogenes Laertius writes that philosophers can be divided into dogmatists (δογματικοί) and effectics (ἐφεκτικοί). Dogmatists assert that things are cognizable, effectics - that they are not cognizable and thus the latter refrain from making judgments about things. If we were to accept that this division fulfills the condition of completeness, then every philosopher (within the framework of the terminology accepted here) is either a PD or an ND. In light of such a division, true skepticism (S) is excluded entirely, while ND is vulnerable to the accusation of self-refutation.

sought, though it is simultaneously asserted that this truth is unattainable. This conceptual hybrid may be called skeptical negative dogmatism (SND).¹⁸ The question arises whether SND could not be considered an expression of the position described earlier as *hupatuphos* ("not entirely free of *tuphos*," "semi-free-from-*vanity*") and whether SND does not describe the views of Xenophanes himself.¹⁹ A further problem, not treated in this paper, is the question of the presence of SND in the views of the Academics and Pyrrhonists, which would explain why these thinkers continually accused others of dogmatism, while simultaneously defending the alleged purity of their own skepticism.

J. H. Lesher²⁰ notes that Xenophanes is considered the first skeptic in the history of Western philosophy, though the character of his skepticism has always been subject to debate, and some scholars even seem to question the presence of skepticism in the Colophonian philosopher's thought.²¹ Of course, this problem is tied with the definition of skepticism accepted here for the purpose of analysis. Above all, there are no grounds when referring to early Greek thought upon which to recognize as skepticism a view that is characteristic of negative dogmatism, because skepticism is an essentially anti-dogmatic position. In this regard, fragment D-K 21B34, cited three times by Sextus Empiricus²² as well as by other authors in fragments,²³ is key.

"καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐτίς ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται."

In his comments on this passage, Sextus Empiricus invokes two differing interpretations. According to the first, Xenophanes claimed that everything is incognizable (*πάντα ἀκατάληπτα*), with Sextus adding that such an interpretation is only propagated by some.²⁴ On these grounds, he includes the thinker from Colophon

¹⁸ From the point of view of the above characterization of S, SND is an oxymoron.

¹⁹ Of course, literally speaking, Timon, and Sextus after him, accuse Xenophanes of supplementing the skeptical elements of his philosophy with positive dogmatic (PD) assertions.

²⁰ Lesher (1978) 1.

²¹ S. Yonezawa writes: "[...] it is already time to disengage Xenophanes from all the sceptical interpretation." Yonezawa (1989) 438.

²² Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 49; VII, 110; VIII, 326.

²³ Hippol., *Ref.*, I, 14; Galen, *De diff. Puls.*, 636-637; Diog. Laërt., IX, 72; Stobaeus, II, 1, 17; Sext. Emp., *Pyr.*, II, 18; Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.*, I, 254.

²⁴ "Ξενοφάνης μὲν κατὰ τινὰς εἰπὼν πάντα ἀκατάληπτα." Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 49.

among those who completely reject the criterion of truth,²⁵ both the truth present in reason (ἐν λόγῳ), and the truth which lies beyond it (ἐν ταῖς ἀλόγοις ἐναργείαις).²⁶ According to the second interpretation, propagated by others (κατὰ τοὺς ὡς ἑτέρως αὐτὸν ἐξηγουμένους),²⁷ Xenophanes did not claim universal acatalepsy, but rather permitted δόκος as a criterion.²⁸ The discrepancies in Sextus' interpretations, corresponding to the discrepancies among Xenophanes' commentators in antiquity, partially stem from difficulties in the Colophonian's text itself, and partially from the source conflict between negative dogmatism and skepticism, or – to use Sextus' terms – between the Academics and the Skeptics.

Referring back to fragment B34, we can assume that the first interpretation pertains to verses 1-2 and 3-4, the second – to the end of verse 4 (δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται). Xenophanes first asserts that no man has ever perceived the clear truth, nor will anyone ever perceive the truth. The word τὸ σαφές suggests that Xenophanes means a clear and distinct truth,²⁹ which resembles Alcmaeon's view.³⁰ It seems that this is not a simple rejection of all convictions as false, because:

1. in the second verse he seems to narrow the objective sphere, about which he says: there is not, and will not be anyone who would know (perceive) ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω [*scil.* Xenophanes] περὶ πάντων.
2. in verses 3-4, he questions the possibility of such knowledge, which encompasses also the knowledge that τετελεσμένον has been spoken. A formulation of τετελεσμένον εἰπών is often read (with reference to Homer) as "speaking of what

²⁵ "Οὗτος μὲν δὴ οὐ φησιν [*sc.* Xenophanes] εἶναι κριτήριον ἀληθείας διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ζητούμενων." Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 52.

²⁶ Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 47.

²⁷ Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 110.

²⁸ "φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον, ἀπολείπειν δὲ τὴν δοξαστήν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ "δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται"." Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 110.

²⁹ J.H. Leshner is of a similar opinion. He writes: "I would argue that 'the certain truth' or 'the clear and certain truth' is the best choice here in fragment 34." Leshner (1992) 156.

³⁰ "περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων, περὶ τῶν θνητῶν σαφῆνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς" Alcmaeon D-K 24B1.

has been brought to completion or fulfillment," while τετελεσμένος signifies that, which has achieved τέλος (fulfillment, accomplishment, result, a state of perfection, its final end, goal).³¹ It seems that we can carefully accept the interpretation which suggests that Xenophanes simply questions complete (fulfilled) knowledge, because there will always remain something that we do not know.

3. in verses 3-4, the thinker from Colophon even rules out knowledge based on the element of contingency (in the expression of the truth on what has been brought to completion); even if one was able to express the τετελεσμένον, he would not know it.³² No man ("the mortals" – D-K 21B14) can claim that his views are the ultimate truth while simultaneously being aware that he possesses them (meta-objective level).

Xenophanes does not assert that all knowledge is unattainable for human beings; he simply questions clear, distinct, and certain knowledge of the gods and on those subjects about which he speaks. Thus, it is clear that according to the thinker from Colophon, man is condemned to opinion and suppositions; certain knowledge (objective and meta-objective), including the knowledge that objective knowledge ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω [*scil.* Xenophanes] περὶ πάντων is possessed, is unattainable. Certain knowledge seems to belong only to the gods (god), whereas

³¹ J. Leshner translates τετελεσμένον εἰπῶν as "to speak just of what has been brought to pass" Leshner (1992) 38; Fränkel, as "(to) speak of what is most fully actual" Fränkel (1974) 122; and Guthrie, as "saying what is true" Guthrie (1962) 395. Other scholars interpret this phrase accenting the element of completeness, for example, Hankinson: "utter the whole truth," Hankinson (1995) 32 and Kirk and Raven: "say the complete truth," Kirk&Raven (1964) 179.

³² Sextus writes: "κἄν γὰρ ἐκ τύχης ἐπιβάλλῃ τούτῳ, ὅμως οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι ἐπιβέβληκεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οἶεται καὶ δοκεῖ" Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 51. In this context Sextus invokes two examples to illustrate this thesis. The first shows a man, who is searching for treasure in a dark room; even if he finds gold and is convinced that he has found it, he will not have certain knowledge as to that fact (Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 52). The second example describes people who shoot arrows at a target in the dark; someone may hit the target, someone else may not, but no one will know this. Elaborating on this metaphor, we can say that according to Sextus, Xenophanes presumes that people live in a world of darkness, that there is no one who could have clear knowledge. Light belongs only to the gods, only they know (see) the truth.

mortals must make do with opinions, convictions, and suppositions (δόκοι).³³ Human cognition is limited, uncertain, and depends on the perspective of the cognizing subject.

The ancient testimonies of Arius Didymus and Varro also set divine knowledge in opposition to human opinion. The former writes: "ὥς ἄρα θεὸς μὲν οἶδε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται,"³⁴ the latter, in turn, notes: "Quid putem, non quid contendam ponam, hominis enim est, haec opinari, Dei scire."³⁵ The question arises of how to classify fragment B34 in light of the tripartite division into positive dogmatism (PD), negative dogmatism (ND), and skepticism (S). Sextus Empiricus had a problem with this himself, for he describes Xenophanes as *hupatuphos*,³⁶ that is, as someone who is moderately free from *tuphos*, and so has not yet freed himself completely of the arrogance of dogmatic judgments. Sextus also indicates two problematic areas which testify to Xenophanes' (positive) dogmatism. The first is his statement that everything is one (ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν), the second concerns his views about god.³⁷ In my opinion, however, there are reasons to doubt Xenophanes' alleged positive dogmatism.

- 1) Doxographical sources (Pseudo-Aristotle, Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus, Cicero, Theodoret, Aëtius, Simplicius), which suggest numerical monism in Xenophanes, are based on the testimonies of Aristotle³⁸ and

³³ For more on this subject, see: Kubok (2010) 3-15.

³⁴ Arius Didymus ap. Stob. *Ecl.* II, 1, 17 (D-K 21A24).

³⁵ Varro ap. Augustinus, *De civ. dei*, VII, 17.

³⁶ *PH* I, 224, cf. Diog. IX, 18.

³⁷ *PH* I, 225.

³⁸ "Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίσας (ὁ γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται γενέσθαι μαθητής) οὐθὲν διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων οὐδετέρας ἔοικε θιγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν." Aristotle, *Met.*, 986 b 21-25.

Plato.³⁹ Thus, it is clear that the idea that "everything is a unity" or "everything is a god" ascribed to Xenophanes is based on the Platonic-Aristotelian conviction that he was the founder of the Eleatic school or even the teacher of Parmenides himself. The alleged dogmatism that appears in the form of numeric monism does not find confirmation in the source texts and seems to be, at the very least, an attempt at systematizing the philosophic tradition by later commentators.

2) Indisputable is the fact that Xenophanes emphatically criticizes various beliefs concerning the gods framed primarily by Homer and Hesiod.⁴⁰ This need not mean that he treats his conception of god dogmatically as final and irrevocable truth. In my opinion Xenophanes first recognizes that people's hitherto notions of the gods result from their subjective views of reality, especially from their views of themselves, and then proposes a concept of god, whose qualities constitute the antithesis of qualities ascribed to the gods by mortals; however, he does so without claiming to present dogmatic (definitive) truth (see D-K 21B35). This is expressed in passage D-K 21B34, which seems to undermine what may be called "theological" dogmatism. It is possible to quote a number of arguments supporting the credibility of the thesis according to which Xenophanes' concept of god (D-K 21B23–B26) was created in opposition to traditional, popular notions of the gods. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that this concept serves mainly to portray the illusiveness of human notions about the gods (epistemological

³⁹ "τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνόησεν ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις." Plato, *Soph.*, 242 d 4-6.

⁴⁰ D-K 21B10, B11, B12, B14, B15, B16, B18.

interpretation), which are created without reflection on humans' ability to come to know them (and, more broadly, disregarding the primacy of epistemological reflections concerning the essence and the limits of human understanding), and not to reform theology (see his elegies) or to create a new concept of one god. It is also possible to put forth the hypothesis that the passages of Xenophanes' works concerning god – making use, in addition, of Gadamer's exegesis of the political utopia introduced by Plato in the *Republic*⁴¹ – could be read as a theological dialectical metaphor, whose aim is to emphasize the epistemological presuppositions of all conceptions concerning notions of the gods.⁴²

Were we to accept the above arguments, it would be reasonable to allow for such an interpretation, which asserts that the dogmatic solutions indicated by Sextus are not necessarily dogmatic – that is, we do not have to treat Xenophanes as a positive dogmatic. A problem arises elsewhere, however. Fragment B34, excluding the last sentence, seems to express a negative dogmatic view, for the Colophonian firmly

⁴¹ "Surely one must read the whole book as one grand dialectical myth. On occasion Plato himself virtually says

that dialectic is its principle. (See 497e: 'tounantion e nun' [opposite of what is now].) Surely one must take all the institutions and structures in this model city as dialectical metaphors. Of course, reading dialectically does not simply mean taking the opposite of what is said, to be the true belief. Here, reading dialectically means relating these Utopian demands in each instance to their opposite, in order to find, somewhere in between, what is really meant — that is, in order to recognize what the circumstances are, and how they could be made better. Per se, the institutions of this model city are not meant to embody ideas for reform. Rather, they should make truly bad conditions and the dangers for the continued existence of a city visible *e contrario*." Gadamer (1986) 70-71. Contrary to Gadamer's interpretation of Plato, Xenophanes is not speaking about finding something between polar opposites, because that is impossible; his construction of a model of god is meant to lead to reflection on the possibility of cognizing god and, what follows, on man's cognitive limitations. This procedure provokes readers to reflect on the reasons for acknowledging traditional notions of the gods within the context of the dialectical proposition formulated by Xenophanes. Xenophanes' theological dialectical metaphor should be viewed as a part of his epistemological investigations rather than as the proposal of a new positive theology. Of course, we should be aware that this is only one possible reading of the few extant fragments of Xenophanes. This interpretation is an attempt at connecting the epistemological and theological fragments.

⁴² For more on this subject, see: Kubok (2013) 5-23.

states that 1) no human has perceived the clear truth, nor will ever attain knowledge ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω [*scil.* Xenophanes] περὶ πάντων, 2) no human can claim that his views of what has been brought to completion are the truth while simultaneously being aware of possessing them; thus, certain knowledge about the accidental state of possessing objective knowledge is also excluded.⁴³ It is worth noting here that Xenophanes seems to distinguish between objective knowledge and knowledge of τετελεσμένον εἰπών, therefore, he makes reference to a meta-level. In this case we are dealing with a thesis of the second order. Fragment B34 thus contains objective (epistemic) and meta-objective (epistemological) theses; either clear and certain knowledge is not attainable, or, if we are in possession of some truth, we are unable to state (to know) that we are in possession of it.

Another problem appears in this context concerning the possibility of reconciling the negative dogmatism in fragment B34 with other fragments which seem to suggest a skeptical position. The significance of this problem lies in the fact that skepticism was characterized above as an anti-dogmatic position. According to the second interpretation of Sextus cited above, Xenophanes did not presume acatalepsy, but rather stated that mortals are condemned to opinion, characterized by uncertainty and not laying claim to being called a clear and distinct truth. The word δόκος is related to the word δόξα, which played an important role in philosophy since the time of Parmenides. For the latter, the opinions characteristic of mortals lack true certainty (οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής).⁴⁴ The root opposition, then, is not truth – falsity, but true certainty – untrue certainty. According to Parmenides,

⁴³ See Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.*, VII, 52; VIII, 325.

⁴⁴ D-K 28B1.30. J. Bryan translates "πίστις ἀληθής" as "genuine cogency." In her opinion, this phrase refers to the logical force of argument, not to a cognitive state. Bryan (2012) 90-93.

opinions investigated in reference to one another can be more or less justified. In D-K 28B1.31-32, Parmenides states that one should come to know ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα/χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι.⁴⁵ Parmenides' description of opinion is an attempt at the best possible (most likely) explanation of the sphere of τὰ δοκοῦντα,⁴⁶ in reference to which mortals are condemned to opinion.⁴⁷ Keeping in mind the necessity of maintaining the proper caution while reading Xenophanes' views through the testimony of Parmenides, it seems that the thinker from Colophon does suggest that though mortals cannot go beyond opinion, better solutions within the bounds of opinion should nonetheless be sought. This element of a continual search for the "better" is an expression of skepticism proper (S) as it was characterized above. For order's sake, it is worth reiterating that a ruling out of what is best – that is, clear and distinct knowledge (with a previously-defined objective sphere) – is an expression of negative dogmatism (ND).

Xenophanes' δόκος, like Parmenides' δόξα, is not an expression of falsehood, but of opinion – of a supposition unable to pretend to certainty. For the thinker from Colophon, these opinions seem to be of a probable, maybe temporary, and also relative character in the sense that they may be revised and substituted by others in time. In passage B34.3-4, Xenophanes states that even if someone succeeded in stating what has been brought to completion, he would not know it; the exclusive aspect of gaining knowledge with a simultaneous emphasis on the impossibility of knowledge on this subject are accented. Two interpretations of the following

⁴⁵ D-K 28B1.31-32.

⁴⁶ "τὰ δοκοῦντα" appears in the work of Simplicius (*In De caelo*, VII, 558, 1), as well as in the D-K edition. In Coxon's edition (1986: 30), on the other hand, we find "τὰ δοκεῦντα."

⁴⁷ Parmenides writes: "τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον εὐκότα πάντα φατίζω, ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τις σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσει." D-K 28B8.60-61.

passage exist; one takes the universal character of opinion in an objective sense, i.e. in reference to all things or to all the topics about which Xenophanes speaks, while the second interpretation understands the universal character of opinion in a subjective sense, i.e. in reference to all men: δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.⁴⁸ Parmenides, in passage D-K 28B8.60, clearly shows that his understanding of the way of opinion concerning order in the world (διάκοσμον) is of an intuitive, probable (plausible) character (ἐοικότα); Xenophanes seems to formulate a similar view:

"ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι ..."⁴⁹

The views of mortals should be recognized (believed) as similar to truth,⁵⁰ since certain cognition is not possible. The conflict about whether the recommendation

⁴⁸ D-K 21B34.4. It is admissible to understand the πᾶσι in this fragment as the neuter (See Heitsch 1983), which ties in to πάντων (B34.2). Of course, it is also possible to read ἐπὶ πᾶσι as "fashioned for all men" (πᾶσι as the masculine) in relation to οὔτις ἀνὴρ (B34.1). "It is more natural to take πᾶσι as masculine than as neuter, and ἐπὶ πᾶσι can mean 'in the power of all'." Burnet (1930) 121, n. 1.

⁴⁹ D-K 21B35. See also: "ἀλλ' οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεοὺς, τὴν σφετέρην δ' ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε." D-K 21B14.

⁵⁰ J. Bryan, in a chapter of his book *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato* entitled "Xenophanes' Fallibilism," states that this passage should be understood in the context of Homer's and Hesiod's works. In addition, Bryan emphasizes that Xenophanes asserts the intrinsic uncertainty of all teachings: "these [teachings] have been believed to be like the truth," which is meant to emphasize the limited nature of human cognition. Thus, we can accept that Xenophanes believed that human opinions could be true, but humans can never be certain of this fact. This passage may also be read as a sort of exhortation to Xenophanes' audience ("Let these [teachings] be believed to be like the truth"). In Bryan's opinion, Xenophanes can be seen as a fallibilist. "Xenophanes is urging us to believe his account to be possibly but uncertainly true [...]. [Xenophanes is] not calling his doctrines untrue, but he is admitting that they could be." Bryan (2012) 46. In another passage, she adds: "I am aware that some may find my fallibilist Xenophanes too modest for their tastes. [...] Surely no one wishing to present a persuasive argument could afford to undermine themselves with an admission that their own account could well be false? My answer to such an objection is threefold. First, I see no reason to think that Xenophanes would value persuasiveness more highly than philosophical truth (no matter how uncertain). [...] Second, if it should turn out that Xenophanes is not arguing for the potential speciousness of his own account *alone*, but rather for the inevitable uncertainty of *all* human accounts, he will be no more undermining his own authority than that of everyone else. Third, I am far from the first to suggest that Xenophanes' epistemology is of a sceptical bent. Sextus, for example, notes that some have interpreted B34 as expressing a fairly universal scepticism. Whilst such interpretations of Xenophanes may well have been motivated by the sceptical agenda of later authors, their very existence demonstrates that such a reading was not considered obviously absurd." Bryan (2012) 47-48. Here, we may add that Xenophanes' skepticism, in contrast to negative dogmatism (called universal skepticism by certain scholars), is simultaneously an expression of his

present in this passage is of a positive or negative character⁵¹ seems to depend on the general perception of the status of δόκος in Xenophanes' philosophy. Opinions, as views with no claims to authoritative certainty can more or less closely resemble truth. In other words, the key problem lies in recognizing the principle that permits us to grasp the criterion allowing us to know when we have discovered what is better. This principle, in Xenophanes' views, is tied with a negation of the dogmatic conviction about the possession of what is best. Such a position is a negation of positive dogmatism with a simultaneous preference for skepticism, which is based upon a continual search for truth (zeteticism), i.e. the "better," along with the awareness that it has not yet been found. The fullest expression of this zetetic procedure of investigation constituting an integral part of skepticism is passage B18. It is worth noting here that Xenophanes' critique of positive dogmatism goes hand in hand with negative dogmatism, whose fullest expression – as has been said – can be found in passage B34.

In passage D-K 21B18, Xenophanes writes:

"οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον."

From the point of view of this problem, Xenophanes' key thought in passage B18 is the conviction that only those who search (ζητοῦντες) are better at finding or find what is better (ἄμεινον). The thinker from Colophon, accenting the value of the discovery of the subjectivity of cognition, emphasizes the significance of the critical attitude, which is realized above all in the zetetic approach. Having rejected the

coming to terms with the lack of final certainty of human assertions that results from humans' cognitive limitations (in contrast to the gods), and an expression of cognitive optimism, as human opinions may resemble the truth or be considered as resembling the truth. This zetetic dimension of cognitive hope can also be found in fragment B18.

⁵¹ See: Leshner (1992) 169-176; Heitsch (1966); Fritz K.von (1967).

Xenophanes of Colophon and the Problem of Distinguishing Between Skepticism and Negative Dogmatism

possibility of possessing certain (clear) knowledge in fragment B34, another expression of negative dogmatism, he indicates the indispensability of human searching, since such a cognitive attitude can lead to the cognitive success which is the finding of the "better." The epistemological passages in Xenophanes lead to cognitive humility, since they force man to recognize the proper cognitive relationship between the cognizer and the cognized. The critique of cognition constitutes the foundation of all theses propagated by the thinker from Colophon, including those which concern the deities and the world. Fragment B18 asserts that only those who search can find what is better; those, on the other hand, who do not search are condemned to what is given to them, and what may turn out to be false, insufficiently justified, or simply time-honored.⁵² In one of his elegies, he writes that wisdom (σοφίη) is better (ἀμείνων) than the strength of men and horses.⁵³ This wisdom is tied with the critical approach of those, who are not satisfied with the faith passed on to them in stories, but are inclined to search for answers to key

⁵² We cannot rule out the fact that Xenophanes was of the opinion that the gods only show certain things to those who search in time, and thus that the realization of human cognitive effort corresponds to divine intervention. "18, 1, as we saw, does not exclude the possibility that some things may have been shown to men by gods, and so hardly amounts to a universal denial of all divine communications. [...] From all this, however, we clearly see that the fragment does not point to any explicit or exclusive disjunction between divine revelation on the one hand, and independent human seeking on the other: for all Xenophanes denies is that the gods gave everything to men at once, while adding that in time, and no doubt partially through their own volition, men find 'the better.'" Tulin (1993) 134. Of course, such a reading of fragment B18 is only one possible reading. Nonetheless, the passages from Xenophanes should be read within the context of the works of Homer and Hesiod. The thinker from Colophon seems to state in fragment B18 that in contrast to the poets, who beg the gods for cognitive gifts, man should seek better solutions on his own; and though human cognition is limited and uncertain, contrary to that of the gods, such an active cognitive approach is still superior to passivity. J.H. Leshner, on the other hand, states that "Xenophanes rejected not the traditional view of the gods as mankind's original benefactors but rather, in virtue of both his novel theology and scientific view of nature, the specific belief that gods communicated with mortals through special natural signs." Leshner (1991) 247. See also: Leshner (1978) 1-21.

⁵³ D-K 21B2.11-12.

questions.⁵⁴ Just as wisdom is better than strength, so seekers will find better than non-seekers, which does not question divine intervention.

In passage B18 of Xenophanes, true skepticism takes on the form of critical zeteticism. The perpetual search is crowned each time with the discovery of something relatively better in relation to what was earlier and turned out to be worse (the fig and honey example). Each discovery brings with it a further search for something even better; in this way, the anti-dogmatic skeptic element is realized, which resists ceasing the investigation characteristic of ND. The skeptical attitude in Xenophanes (in this passage) is based on the preparation of a research procedure, which J. Philippoussis calls "the zetetic hypothetico-comparative logic,"⁵⁵ and which I describe as zetetic-syncretic skepticism.⁵⁶ This procedure (syncreticism) boils down to an incessant search in the form of comparing (juxtaposing) convictions in order to grasp what is better, not the dogmatic (PD) assertion that what is best (ἄριστον) has been found.⁵⁷ An essential difference between true S and SND is visible on the basis of this last example. S seeks what is better without asserting that what is best is impossible to achieve, while SND seeks what is better while simultaneously presupposing that the best is impossible to achieve.

⁵⁴ For moral and political consequences of Xenophanes' σοφίη see Porubjak (2012) 80-82.

⁵⁵ Philippoussis (1989) 332.

⁵⁶ Diogenes Laertios, when discussing the views of the skeptics, makes (IX, 77) a distinction (1) between those, who express themselves δογματικῶς and those, who express themselves ἀποδεικτικῶς. In a different passage (IX, 74-75), when discussing the phrase οὐ μᾶλλον, we can find a distinction (2) between those, who assert something δογματικῶς and those, who assert something συγκριτικῶς. It is worth noting that likewise for Xenophanes both the apodeictic and syncretical views stand in opposition to dogmatism and simultaneously can only be relative tied with what is "better," not with what is "best." Apodeictic-syncretical anti-dogmatism thus becomes one form of skepticism.

⁵⁷ J. Philippoussis writes: "The comparison, result of a critique, implies both a critic (a human observer) and a criterion (be it a relative one). But the relative criterion provides only a relative and conjectural conclusion and, as both the criterion and the conclusion are subject to doubt and revision, they can always be re-questioned and revised." Philippoussis (1989) 333.

Xenophanes of Colophon and the Problem of Distinguishing Between Skepticism and Negative Dogmatism

Distinguishing three types of cognitive approaches, i.e. positive dogmatism, negative dogmatism, and skepticism, it must be said that the last of these is a negation of the first two.⁵⁸ A skeptic is one who states that he does not know whether the truth can be cognized or whether it cannot be cognized, and so continues searching. Xenophanes was certainly critical of positive dogmatism (PD) based on tradition and claims to possess the ultimate truth. In light of the above analysis, however, we must also admit that in extant fragments of his works, especially fragment B34, we can also find elements of a negative dogmatic position (ND), since the thinker from Colophon emphatically states that there is no one, who could possess the clear truth ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω [*scil.* Xenophanes] περὶ πάντων, nor can knowledge be had about the fact that it has been possessed (even accidentally). On the other hand, passage B18 presents a skeptical approach (S) that boils down to zetetic anti-dogmatism.

In modern discussions on skepticism, various typologies of skepticism are put forth. Within the context of Xenophanes' views, it is worth referring to two such divisions: (1) modal and actual skepticism, and (2) global and local skepticism. In light of the typology originating from Sextus Empiricus and accepted in this paper, actual dogmatism (AD), signifying the declaration that one possesses knowledge, must be distinguished from modal dogmatism (MD) asserting that one can possess knowledge; and, respectively, negative actual dogmatism (NAD) would signify that one voicing such views asserts that he does not possess knowledge, whereas negative modal dogmatism (NMD) would amount to the thesis that knowledge cannot be possessed. Literally speaking, in light of the division he makes in the

⁵⁸ Woleński (1992) 18-19.

Outlines of Pyrrhonism (I, 1-2), Sextus mentions AD and NMD, while understanding skepticism as their negation. This problem is already visible in Xenophanes. In D-K 21B34.1-2 he writes that no man knew (ἴδεν) in the past clear and certain truth about the gods, or about any of the things Xenophanes spoke about, from which it can be concluded that he also does not presently possess the clear truth, so he negates AD; the further part of the fragment (D-K 21B34.1-2 and B34.3-4, especially in light of Sextus' comments: *Adv. math.*, VII, 52) unambiguously professes NMD.⁵⁹ It is clear, therefore, that if AD, then MD, and if NMD, then also NAD, never the other way around. From this it follows that skepticism should be a negation of both MD and NMD (in its stronger version), that is, that the skeptic searches for truth, but does not prejudge whether he will or will not find (possess) it. The problem is that Xenophanes criticizes AD and professes NMD, while implying S in B18. Regarding the second division, the thinker from Colophon seems to stand for negative local, not global, dogmatism, which the phrase ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων attests to. This does not have to signify, though, that in regards to other subjects positive certain knowledge is possible; we simply do not have any testimonies that could settle this issue.

Of course, it is clear that skepticism and dogmatism (positive or negative), the way they are characterized above, cannot be reconciled. From this it follows that Xenophanes was probably unaware of the fundamental difference between

⁵⁹ R. J. Hankinson believes that this comment of Sextus' "makes Xenophanes a negative E-dogmatist: 'there is nothing apprehensible in the nature of the things sought' (M 7 52)" Hankinson (1995) 32. On the other hand, in his opinion, the subsequent passage in Sextus (M 7 53-54) treats Xenophanes as a negative O-dogmatist. It should be noted here that in fragment B34.1-2 Xenophanes speaks about the future, stating, "nor will there be one who knows..." However, we can accept that, since no one has had clear and certain knowledge on this subject in the past, and no one will have such knowledge in the future, such knowledge cannot be attained.

skepticism and negative dogmatism; in any case, there are no counterarguments to be found in the extant passages of his works. In other words, we do not explicitly find in his views a position according to which skepticism is both a negation of positive and negative dogmatism. Rather, we can assume that in his philosophy skepticism and negative dogmatism were not differentiated between. Such an approach assumes a perpetual search for the "better" (zetetic-syncretic skepticism), with the awareness that we will never achieve ultimate and certain knowledge (negative dogmatism). "Pure" skepticism (S) would be, on the other hand, a perpetual search for truth without the conviction that it has been discovered (or will be discovered) and without the assumption that it cannot be discovered. Taking into account all extant passages of Xenophanes, we can say that as a whole they present a SND position, but not in the sense that the thinker from Colophon mixes S and ND, but rather that he does not yet differentiate between their sources. Thus, he may be described *ex post* with the adjective *hupatuphos* not because he has freed himself of PD, but rather because he has not freed himself of ND. It is also worth noting that a lack of distinction between S and ND, and in later times the understanding of skepticism as ND came to present a large challenge for philosophers and not infrequently has resulted in accusations of self-refutation and inconsistency. In connection with this, it is worth keeping in mind that true skepticism (S) as a negation of both PD and ND was born with Greek philosophy itself. Despite the difficulty skepticism has had in separating itself from the negative dogmatism it had been so integrally tied with, it can presently be treated as an essential voice in philosophical discussions, for skepticism thus understood forces us to take on a

critical attitude while simultaneously holding us back from various forms of dogmatism.

D. K.

WORKS CITED

- Barnes, J. 2007. "Sextan Scepticism", in D. Scott (ed.) *Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 322-334.
- Bett, R. 2003. *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bryan, J. 2012. *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*. Cambridge Classical Studies. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Burnet, J. 1930. *Early Greek Philosophy*. London: Adam and Charles Black.
- Coxon, A.H. 1986. *The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction, Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 1985. Griechisch und Deutsch von H. Diels, herausgeg. von W. Kranz. Bd. 1 – 3. Zürich: Weidmann.
- Diogenis Laertii 1964: *Vitae Philosophorum*. Rec. H. S. Long. Oxonii.
- Döring, A. 1900. "Xenophanes", in *Preußische Jahrbücher*. Bd. 99.
- Fränkel, H. 1974. *Xenophanes' Empiricism and His Critique of Knowledge*, in A.P.D. Mourelatos (ed.) *The Pre-Socratics*, Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 118–131.
- Frede, M. 1997. *The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge*, in M. Burnyeat and Michael Frede (eds.) *The Original Sceptics: A Controversy*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 127-151.
- Fritz, K. Von 1967. "Xenophanes", in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Ed. By G. Wissowa. Ser. 2. Vol. 9 A.2, cols. 1541-1562.

Xenophanes of Colophon and the Problem of Distinguishing Between Skepticism and Negative Dogmatism

- Gadamer, H.-G. 1986. *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. Translated and with an Introduction and Annotation by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gigon, O. 1968. *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie. Von Hesiod bis Parmenides*. Basel und Stuttgart: Schwabe.
- Guthrie, W. K. C. 1962. *A History of Greek Philosophy. Volume 1: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hankinson, R. J. 1995. *The Sceptics. The Arguments of the Philosophers*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Heitsch, E. 1966. "Das Wissen des Xenophanes", in *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge*, Bd. 109: 193-235.
- 1983. *Xenophanes: Die Fragmente*. Munich and Zurich: Artemis Verlag.
- Kirk, G. S. & Raven, J. E. 1964. *Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kubok, D. 2013. "Ksenofanes z Kolofonu i greckie źródła problemu poznania", in *Analiza i Egzystencja* 23: 5-23.
- 2010, "O półtrzeźwości Ksenofanesa", in *Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne* 8 [43]: 3-15.
- Leshner, J. H. 1992. *Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary* by J.H. Leshner. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
- 1991. "Xenophanes on Inquiry and Discovery: An Alternative to the 'Hymn to Progress' Reading of Fr. 18", in *Ancient Philosophy* 11: 229-248.
- 1978. "Xenophanes' Scepticism", in *Phronesis* 23 (1): 1-21.
- Lesses, G. 2002. "Pyrrho the Dogmatist", in *Apeiron* 35 (3): 255–271.
- Philippoussis, J. 1989. "The gnoseological and metaphysical particularity of Xenophanes' thought", in K. J. Boudouris (ed.) *Ionian Philosophy*. Athens: International Association for Greek philosophy and International Center for Greek philosophy and culture.
- Porubjak, M. 2012. *Najstaršie podoby európskej etiky v antickom období (Kapitoly z aplikovanej etiky II)*. Trnava: FF UCM v Trnave.
- Gentili, B. & Prato, C. 1988. *Poetarum Elegiacorum Testimonia et Fragmenta*. Pars prior. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Sexti Empirici: *Adversus mathematicos* in: *Sexti Empirici Opera*. Rec. H. Mutschmann. II *Adversus dogmaticos libros quinque (Adv. Math. VII-XI)*

-
- continens. Lipsiae, in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri 1914; III *Adversus mathematicos libros I-VI* continens. Ed. J. Mau, ib. 1961.
- Sextus Empiricus 1990. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. R. G. Bury (trans.). Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
- Svavarsson, S. H. 2002. "Pyrrho's Dogmatic Nature", in *Classical Quarterly* 52 (1): 248-256.
- 2010. "Pyrrho and Early Pyrrhonism", in R. Bett (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 36-57.
- Tulin, A. 1993. "Xenophanes Fr. 18 D.-K. And the Origins of the Idea of Progress", in *Hermes* 121: 129-138.
- Wiesner, J. 1997. "Wissen und Skepsis bei Xenophanes", in *Hermes* 125: 17-33.
- Woleński, J. 1992. "A note on scepticism", in *Kriterion* 3: 18-19.
- 2013, "Logika epistemiczna i sceptycyzm", in D. Leszczyński (ed.) *Studia Systematica 3: Wiedza*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Yonezawa, S. 1989. "Xenophanes: His Self-Consciousness as a Wise man and Fr. 34", in K. J. Boudouris (ed.) *Ionian Philosophy*. Athens: International Association for Greek philosophy and International Center for Greek philosophy and culture.
- Zeller, E. 1963. *Die philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen entwicklung*. Teil 1. Hildesheim: G. Olms.