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## Xenophon's Representation of Socratic διαλέγεσθαι

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**ABSTRACT:** This paper deals with the problem of Xenophon's representation of Socratic *διαλέγεσθαι* (dialogic conversation). The author analyzes selected examples of its use by Xenophon in his adaptation of the Socratic ethics in *Memorabilia* and compares it with Plato's use of *διαλέγεσθαι* in his early dialogues. The main hypothesis of this paper is that the Socratic use of *διαλέγεσθαι* should not be identified with Socrates' use of elenchus (*ἔλεγχος*). The author suggests an implication of this hypothesis is that the question-answer turn-taking form of *διαλέγεσθαι* is not its essential feature. He attempts to demonstrate that what constitutes the essence of both Socrates' use of *διαλέγεσθαι* in Xenophon's *Memorabilia 4* and of Odysseus' use of persuasive speech in Antisthenes' *Odysseus or on Odysseus* is the purpose of examining and transforming one's individual ethos (*ἦθος*).

**KEY-WORDS:** Dialogue, examination, rhetoric, self-control, temperance, virtue

The vast majority of modern scholars (from Zeller 1877, p. 295; to L. E. Navia 2001, pp. 5, 76, 90) have compared Antisthenes' argumentation with that of the sophists. G. Giannantoni (*SSR*, IV, p. 368) was the first to trigger a systematic investigation of the relation of Antisthenes' fragments to the Socratic art of dialoguing (*διαλέγεσθαι*<sup>1</sup>). This question was subsequently recognized as constituting a

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<sup>1</sup> The deponent verb form *διαλέγεσθαι* is derived from the verb *διαλέγω-*, which according to the Liddell etc. *Greek – English Lexicon (LSJ)*, 1996, 400) denotes in its active forms an activity of selection, separation, investigation, or comparison. In its deponent verb forms it can be used to express the activity of conversing, discussing some particular question, defining or arguing. Considerably more abstract meanings of this verb are that of discoursing, inferring or calculating. In a deponent form of the present tense infinitive in a mediopassive voice *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* it possibly relates to practicing dialectics or drawing conclusions in a dialogue. But further derivations of *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* do not exclude

framework for exegesis of Antisthenes' fragments and his views concerning the nature of language.<sup>2</sup> In this paper I would like to demonstrate that even in the Xenophon's Socratic texts it is possible to identify traces of Antisthenes' indirect representation of Socratic *διαλέγεσθαι*.<sup>3</sup> I will focus on *Memorabilia* 4, where I assume that Socrates is using *διαλέγεσθαι* in a way similar to that in which Odysseus uses it in the speech of Antisthenes named after him<sup>4</sup> for the purpose of examining the ethical characteristics of his interlocutors.

The use of the expression *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*<sup>5</sup> in its substantivized verb form to denote an inquiry into the nature of things, their truth and falsity, through the form of short question-answer conversational turn-taking is found for the first time in Xenophon's *Mem.* 4.5.12.<sup>6</sup> Xenophon states here that Socrates derived the origin of *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* from the practice of people's common deliberation (*διαλέγομαι*), which is capable of sorting and discussing things after their kinds (*διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα*). Late Plato defines Socratic *διαλέγεσθαι* in a similar way (e.g. in *Soph.* 276d) and distinguishes the two sides of it.<sup>7</sup> However, I assume that the main difference lies in the fact that Xenophon's Socrates does not sharply separate the rhetorical and the dialectical function of speech in the abovementioned type of conversation. In *Mem.* 4.5.14-15 Xenophon describes Socrates being a skillful orator, as he was always able to gain a greater measure of assent from his hearers (*ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε*) than any other man he had seen (*τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα*). According to Xenophon, Socrates used to recall the credit Homer had given to Odysseus for being a "safe speaker" (*τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα*), as he always found a way to lead the discussion from one acknowledged truth to another (*ὡς ἰκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους*).

The conversational method ascribed to Socrates in Xenophon's recollection is that of gaining a general assent to the discussion's root proposition. In *Mem.* 4.6.13 Xenophon states that if someone asserted his proposition to be true without providing any relevant proof (*εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως*), Socrates would lead the whole discussion back to the root hypothesis (*ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἅν πάντα τὸν λόγον*).<sup>8</sup> Whenever Socrates himself was required to provide a proof of his own proposition (*ὁπότε δὲ αὐτὸς τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίει*), he chose,

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also delivering a lecture, expressing oneself using a dialect, writing in the form of prose, etc. (cf. *LSJ*, 1996, 400).

<sup>2</sup> See: (Celluprica, 1987, pp. 285-328).

<sup>3</sup> This paper is an output of the grant project: "Miesto kynizmu v sokratike (*The Place of Cynicism in the Socratic Movement*)," VEGA 1/0448/11.

<sup>4</sup> cf. the title of Antisthenes' speech *Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσεύως*. (=fr. V A 54, SSR).

<sup>5</sup> The occurrence of this expression with an article (an articulated infinitive replacing a noun) in *Mem.* 4.5.12.3 is according to the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (TLG, 2009) the only occurrence of its substantivized verb form to be found in Xenophon's texts. The TLG indicates at least three further occurrences of this verb form in Plato's dialogues (*Prot.* 348c4; *Resp.* 532a2; *Resp.* 537e1) and four in the corpus of the texts of Aristotle and his commentators (*Met.* 1006b8; 1062b11, 1063b11; *Soph. el.* 176a13). The exception is Plato, in whose dialogues (e.g. *Gorg.* 485; *Symp.* 181a1; *Theat.* 196e2) TLG finds nearly sixty occurrences of *διαλέγεσθαι* in its various forms. Xenophon's texts (e.g. *Cyr.* 6.1; *Hell.* 1.6, 5.4; *Mem.* 1.2, 4.5; *Symp.* 13.18; or *Const. Lac.* 2.12; *Oecon.* 1.17, 7.10) represent the second richest source of its occurrence.

<sup>6</sup> See: (Panczová, 2012, 337).

<sup>7</sup> The first is *διαίρεσις*, the second *συναγωγή*, or *σύνοψις*. (cf. *LSJ*: "τῶν γενῶν κατ' εἶδη δ." Pl. *Sph.* 267d; "ἢ διὰ τῶν γενῶν δ." Arist. *APr.* 46a31; opp. *συναγωγαί*, Pl. *Phdr.* 266b).

<sup>8</sup> Xenophon describes this procedure in *Mem.* 4.6.14, writing: "By this process of leading back the argument even his adversary came to see the truth clearly (*οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων καὶ τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερὸν ἐγίγνωτο τῆς ἀληθείας*)."

according to Xenophon, the previously mentioned method of gaining assent based on generally acknowledged truths (*διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο*) because he reckoned it to be the only safe proving mode (*νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου*).<sup>9</sup>

Thus, the condition for Socrates' use of *διαλέγεσθαι* for the purpose of an examination of the interlocutor's ethical character is truthful speaking, or in other words, the truthful use of the persuasive power of rhetoric. In a conversation with Critobulus Socrates refuses to use manipulative rhetoric to praise the personal attributes of his character in order to gain him friends if these qualities are not really true.

“She [Aspasia] once told me that good matchmakers are successful in making marriages only when the good reports they carry to and fro are true (*ἔφη γὰρ τὰς ἀγαθὰς προμνηστρίδας μετὰ μὲν ἀληθείας τὰγαθὰ διαγγελλούσας δεινὰς εἶναι συνάγειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς κηδεῖαν*) [...] I am convinced that this is sound... (*ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεισθεὶς ὀρθῶς*).”<sup>10</sup>

The best Socrates has to recommend to Critobulus in response is to really try to be good:

“Nay, Critobulus, if you want to be thought good at anything, you must try to be so; that is the quickest, the surest, the best way (*ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη ὁδός*).<sup>11</sup> You will find on reflection that every kind of virtue named among men is increased by study and practice (*ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται, σκοπούμενος εὐρήσεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανόμενας*).”<sup>12</sup>

As far as truthful rhetoric presents for Xenophon's Socrates a condition for a deliberative conversational examination of one's ethical character, the persuasive use of speech and the brief question-answer form of *διαλέγεσθαι* do not exclude each other. In addition, they work well together as mutual complements and enable Xenophon to supplement the dialogical form with narrative frameworks in the first person perspective, which give his “*Ἀπομνημονευματα*” the design of a personal memoir. In this sense he invents a completely new literary subgenre of *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι*.<sup>13</sup> This stylistic feature at the same time provides him with an opportunity to

<sup>9</sup> cf. Xen., *Mem.* 4.6.15

<sup>10</sup> cf. Xen., *Mem.* 2.6.36

<sup>11</sup> See also: Xen. *Cyr.* I.6.22; where Xenophon makes a similar claim.

<sup>12</sup> cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.39

<sup>13</sup> On the problem of the genre definition of *Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι* see: (Clay, 1994, pp. 23-47). In: (Waerdt, 1994). According to Patzer (2010, p. 229) the issue of the Ethical (*ἠθική*) and the Good (*ἀγαθός*) since the times of Aristotle has presented a cardinal motif for the works of the close circle of Socrates' companions and disciples (*Σωκρατικοί*), who attempted in their literary activities to produce representations of Socrates himself. In *Poet.* 1447a28-b13 and *Rhet.* 1417a18-21, Aristotle refers to their works as Socratic prose (*λόγος Σωκρατικός*) or Socratic dialogue (*διάλογος Σωκρατικός*) and thus names a whole new genre of prose in dialogic form depicting Socrates' dialectical conversations. Patzer (2010, p. 231) also notices that Xenophon, with his characteristic use of narrative technique, differs not only from Plato but also from the other Socratics, as he bridges over the literary gap

give the first two chapters of his *Memorabilia* a persuasively apologetic tone. Plato, on the other hand, deprives rhetoric (*ῥητορική*) of any possibility of giving reasons for its claims. In *Gorg.* 465a-c Socrates refuses to call art (*τέχνη*) anything that is irrational (*ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ἧ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα*). He holds that rhetoric is not an art (*τέχνη*) but a habitude (*ἐμπειρία*), the reason being that it has no account to give of the real nature of things and thus cannot tell their cause. Despite the fact that in Plato's early aporetic dialogues<sup>14</sup> Socrates uses *διαλέγεσθαι* to investigate an interlocutor's character in the same way as Xenophon's Socrates, Plato begins to transform it step by step into a dialectical art (*ἡ διαλεκτική τέχνη*).<sup>15</sup> In *Resp.* 532a2 Plato states that it is "the very law which dialectic recites" (*οὗτος ἦδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει*) to look at things themselves. It reminds him of vision in the sense that when anyone attempts with its aid to find one's way to the bare essence of each thing through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense (*οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν*) and does not desist until he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, and as in the case of vision the other comes to the goal of the visible. Plato claims that in order to find confirmation only the "dialectic method" (*ἡ διαλεκτική μέθοδος*) is capable of doing away with the hypotheses up to the first principles (*ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν*).<sup>16</sup>

It seems that for Plato, at least in the period after writing *Republic*, the art of the dialectic (*ἡ διαλεκτική τέχνη*) is evidently the only method for overcoming hypotheses in the process of examination and the only method which enables the approximation of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) concerning some particular thing. The condition for knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) for Plato's Socrates is represented by the possibility of giving reasoned accounts which would remove the underlying hypotheses. Rhetoric (*ῥητορική*) in his view, however, can be effective only in the sphere of opinions (*δόξαι*), since he found it unable to surpass the hypotheses and to give an account explaining the causes of things. In *Gorgias* 517a Socrates supposes that truthful use of rhetoric is condemned to rejection, particularly when applied in political discourse (by the so-called "great men" – be they past or present):

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between the author and his work of art, which indicates by the other Socratics the fictional character of Socrates' representation. Patzer suggests (2010, p. 233) that Xenophon as a storyteller might have probably used a representation of Socrates' *διαλέγεσθαι* of some elder Socratic as a "guarantee of reliability" of his deployed narrative technique. In this paper I intend to argue that this elder representation was that of Antisthenes.

<sup>14</sup> See a description of Socrates leading a dialogue in Plat. *Lach.* 187e-188a.

<sup>15</sup> D. M. Timmerman (1993, p. 117) points out that since *διαλέγεσθαι* had originally implied an activity of conversing in a wider sense, Plato intended his *ἡ διαλεκτική τέχνη* to be an art of dialoguing. D. M. Timmerman and E. Schiappa (2010, pp. 34-40) also call to attention three crucial aspects of Plato's use and description of *διαλέγεσθαι*. First, Plato described it as a legitimate philosophical practice and distinguished it from the "sophistic" practices of eristic and antilogic. Second, since for him dialogue associates closely with art or skill, only a properly trained person is capable of reaching it; and finally, because of the rule-governed character of dialoguing, the dialectician is able to transform the sophistic practice of dialogue into an art (*ἡ διαλεκτική τέχνη*). Timmerman and Schiappa (2010, p. 26) also describe Plato's use of *διαλέγεσθαι* in *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* in four distinctive points: "The term describes a practice that (1) is rule-governed, (2) is a definable event in space and time, (3) involves question and answer, (4) aims at reaching a decision."

<sup>16</sup> cf. Plat. *Resp.* 533d.

“But these we have found to be on a par with ours of the present day and so, if they were orators, they employed neither the genuine art of rhetoric (οὔτε τῆ ἀληθινῆ ῥητορικῆ ἐχρῶντο) —else they would not have been thrown out—nor the flattering form of it (οὔτε τῆ κολακικῆ).”<sup>17</sup>

As long as an opinion (δόξα) does not aim at inducing a good state of one's true character, rhetoric (ῥητορικῆ) that uses this opinion turns into a flattery (ἢ κολακευτικὴ αἰσδομένη). The flattering form of rhetoric (κολακικῆ ῥητορικῆ) persuades according to the taste of the majority. In a later dialogue, *Phaedrus*, Plato returns to the issue of the relation of dialectic and rhetoric again after elaborating his conception of the dialectic method in Book 7 of his *Republic*. In *Phaedr.* 260a Socrates' interlocutor claims:

“I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.”

Socrates disagrees with this proclamation, as he subsequently replies in *Phaedr.* 260c-d:

“Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the ‘shadow of an ass’ under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?”

Finally, he recalls a saying of the Laconian that the real art of speaking which does not seize hold of truth does not exist and never will (τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτιμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἠφθαι οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποτε ὑστερον γένηται).<sup>18</sup> Plato's Socrates evidently uses διαλέγεσθαι as a serum against the language trickery of the sophists.<sup>19</sup> He transforms the sophistical praxis of argumentation into a teachable philosophical “art of dialoguing” (ἢ διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη).

A. Patzer (2010, p. 236) assumes that despite the fact that Xenophon's Socrates was not consistent in using dialectic in any way similar to Plato, Xenophon provably worked out a compilation of paradigms of Socratic dialectic. The proof is found in Book 1 of his *Memorabilia* containing allusions to early Plato's aporetic dialogues (namely *Protagoras*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Eutyphro* and *Hippias Minor*). If we compare the representation of Socrates' διαλέγεσθαι in Plato's early dialogues with its representation by Xenophon, it seems that Xenophon does not limit

<sup>17</sup> See: Plat. *Gorg.* 517a.

<sup>18</sup> cf. Plat. *Phaedr.* 260e.

<sup>19</sup> cf. Plat. *Euthyd.* 298d-e.



himself to narrow references but uses dialectic in a substantially different way. Schleiermacher's 19<sup>th</sup> century romantic interpretation of Xenophon's Socrates excluded not only the use of a specific dialectic method but undervalued the importance of Socratic conversation (*διαλέγεσθαι*) in Xenophon's representation of Socrates.<sup>20</sup> His representation of Socratic *διαλέγεσθαι* contrasts with Plato's in that it does not exclude the use of rhetoric's persuasive power for the purpose of examining one's individual *ἦθος* (ethos, or character). Meanwhile, Plato's Socrates does not suppose the true use of rhetorical devices could be helpful for approximating the truth and achieving an improvement or transformation of character, though—Xenophon's does. In *Mem.* 4.5.12 Socrates claims that one should be ready and prepared for *διαλέγεσθαι* and be zealous for it – as it makes for excellence, leadership and skill in discussion (*ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους*). Moreover, simplified, for Xenophon the meanings of the words 'sage' (*σοφός*) and 'sophist' (*σοφιστής*) are nearly synonymous.<sup>21</sup>

Sophists are men of 'inventive' or 'artful' thought, like those, whose books Euthydemus, Socrates' partner in a conversation of *Mem.* 4.2, collects because he reckons them to be useful for his education.<sup>22</sup> But in a conversation (*διαλέγεσθαι*) with Socrates consisting of the four elenctic parts, Euthydemus encounters a cross-examination of his opinions grounded in the previous studies of the sophist literature and his previous habits of education. D. M. Morrison (2010, p. 197) considers this conversation to be the most detailed account we possess of how Socrates conducted himself in selecting and intellectually seducing his young associates. In *Mem.* 4.1.3 Socrates sets the stage for this encounter. But the process of examination differs from its depiction by Plato. Socrates uses elenchus (*ἐλέγχος*) here as a kind of a middle stage and not necessarily with a negative outcome. In the very first phase Socrates does not address Euthydemus directly but uses dialogue with the other participants to evoke in Euthydemus a desire to be addressed.<sup>23</sup> In the next step, Socrates mentions

<sup>20</sup> cf. Dorion (2011, pp. 1-23). In: (Morrison, 2011). Patzer doubted this interpretation in his study *Der Xenophontische Sokrates als Dialektiker* (Patzer, 1999). He did not take the art of dialogue (*διαλεκτική τέχνη*) to be Plato's but directly Socrates' invention, for in dialectical turns Socrates appears as a rule in the role of a questioner (Patzer, 2010, 229). He approached the Socratic dialogue in the intentions which *διαλέγεσθαι* gained exclusively in Plato's dialogues and thus opposed the Socratic "art of dialogue" (*διαλεκτική τέχνη*) to the rhetorical practice of the sophists. Patzer considered the motivation of Socrates' dialectic activity to be his disavowal of knowledge, that which led him to seek answers in conversations with others. Socrates' dialectic in Patzer's interpretation, however, never extends beyond the sphere of human practice in which it is grounded not only by its method but also by the subject of its study – the Good (Patzer, 2010, p. 229). In fact, it is an enormously difficult task, if even possible, to reconstruct who was first in the genre of Socratic literature (*Σωκρατικοί λόγοι*) to use the dialogic form. For a complex exposition of this problem, see e.g. (Clay, 1994, pp. 23-47).

<sup>21</sup> For an illustration of Xenophon's use of these words, see his description of Prodicus and Antisthenes in *Symp.* 4. 62. cf. *Mem.* 1.6.1; for his description of Antiphon's character, see also: (Classen, 1984, pp. 154-167). In: *Hermes*, (2nd Qtr., 1984).

<sup>22</sup> cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1.

<sup>23</sup> Morrison (2010, pp. 197-199) distinguishes seven stages of Socrates' conversational testing of Euthydemus' character (elenchus appears as late as in stage 4) and identifies three traits which Socrates reckoned to be most important for the souls of his interlocutors: (1) the ability to learn quickly; (2) the ability to remember what had been learned; (3) a desire for every kind of knowledge by which they could manage the household and the city and deal comfortably with men and their affairs. These are essentially all gifts of nature but in principle improvable in practice. Socrates did not approach all of his interlocutors in the same manner, and Morrison 2010, 198) suggests that based on these differences in character we are able to distinguish three different types of Socrates' interlocutors: (1) those who thought that nature has made them good and who did not crave being instructed; (2) those who considered themselves to be good because of their wealth; (3) those who believed themselves to be

him by name in order to lightly mock him and with irony alludes to his lack of a teacher and instruction. He then makes some general comments about the importance of having a teacher and being instructed and the overall importance of training for those who aspire to a public career. Socrates gives Euthydemus sufficient time to realize that these comments apply to him. Only after Socrates is sure Euthydemus will endure direct cross-examination does he start with elenchus (ἐλεγχος) to reveal to Euthydemus his own ignorance and self-deception. But before the refutation comes into play, Socrates, in the privacy of a leatherworkers' shop, flatters Euthydemus' desire for knowledge, the false proof of which is his book collection and his ambition to appear wise in public. The root proposition to be questioned with the aid of elenchus in Euthydemus' case is:

“I think I can show myself to be as just as any man  
(οὐδενὸς ἂν ἤττον φανῆναι δίκαιος).”<sup>24</sup>

Socrates then prepares the ground for the refutation itself by drawing in a condition that the one who is just (δίκαιος) must be able to rehearse the works (τὰ ἔργα) of justice (τῆς δικαιοσύνης), for just men (οἱ δίκαιοι), like craftsmen, must have their discriminating works or products (τὰ ἔργα). As Morrison (2010, p. 201) points out, the elenchus here will be logically stronger than the one we find in Plato's early dialogues, because Socrates does not claim that craftsmen must be able to explain their art,<sup>25</sup> which was Plato's general precondition for defining something as an art (τέχνη) and at the same time his argument against classifying rhetoric as an art (τέχνη). The minimal condition is that they are able to discriminate products of their art from other things, and it is above all important to note that this is precisely the condition which enables them to discuss things after their kinds (διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα). Xenophon describes this later in *Mem.* 4.5.12 as the practice of people's common deliberation (διαλέγομαι), from which Socrates derives τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. He asks Euthydemus to imagine a table which would divide human acts into two kinds – just (δίκαιον) and unjust (ἄδικον). With the aid of series of brief questions and lucid examples he draws Euthydemus to the recognition that he is unable to complete this classification successfully and thus fails to prove what he claimed in the root proposition to be his true character (ἦθος). Euthydemus is now in a state of a man “who does not know what he thought he knew” (δῆλος νῆ Δί' εἶναι ὅτι ἂ ᾤετο εἶδέναι οὐκ οἶδεν). Subsequently, he finds himself being trapped in an aporetic situation and seeks the possibility of improvement.<sup>26</sup> Morrison (2010, p. 202) describes this situation as a turning point of the examination, because only now does Euthydemus realize the ignorance and deceptiveness of his previous method of attaining knowledge – but he is left with no clues about what to do. Then Socrates comes with an exhortation of the Delphic maxim “Know Thyself” (γνώθι σαυτόν),<sup>27</sup> but Euthydemus has no idea where to begin with self-knowledge and asks Socrates for instruction (ὁπόθεν δὲ χρὴ ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτόν, τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπω εἴ μοι

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educated in the finest manner and were conceited because of this. Euthydemus' character was of the last kind. For his type διαλέγεσθαι might have been most important, as he thought that he already had the desired knowledge which enabled Socrates to use his elenchus (ἐλεγχος) in an examination of his opinions.

<sup>24</sup> See: cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.12.

<sup>25</sup> See: Plat. *Gorg.* 465a.

<sup>26</sup> cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.21-23.

<sup>27</sup> See: Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.24.

ἐθελήσῃς ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι). Only then do the strongest refutations and aporia follow, and Socrates proceeds by a further elenchus to prove to Euthydemus that he is not even able to distinguish the good from the bad.<sup>28</sup>

After this process Euthydemus is in a state in which many interlocutors are no longer willing to continue the examination and do not return to Socrates anymore. But Euthydemus is willing to spend time with him and to imitate the distinctive features of his personality, from his character to his lifestyle. Only after being assured that the interlocutor is of the right character does Socrates enter the last phase of the teaching, in which he accepts the interlocutor as an associate who shares his values and attitude toward life. The positive teaching that Xenophon's Socrates gives to his closest associates is that of exhorting them to the care for the self (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ). This advice, however, does not exclude sharp cross-examination in the form of an elenchus, as in the cases of e.g. the conversations with Critobulus and Euthydemus mentioned above. C. Natali (2006, p. 4) observes that the division of the subject of inquiry into pairs of positive and negative headings that we just encountered in the conversation with Euthydemus (i.e. just and unjust acts) is not followed consistently in *Memorabilia*. The teaching of Xenophon's Socrates is not completed only by the use of elenchus, but also includes contents revealed in everyday conversation with close companions.<sup>29</sup> Xenophon's Socrates is provably an advice-giver and teacher. Natali (2006, p. 5) supposes *Memorabilia* to be the main testimony for Socrates' non-refuting dialectic. In *Mem.* 1.4.1-2 Socrates' exhortation to virtue (ἀρετή) is even identified with the everyday conversation with his companions.

Natali (2006, p. 7) points out an important feature of Xenophon's representation of Socrates' διαλέγεσθαι – elenchus is not to be identified with it but rather serves as a preliminary technique for the preparation of particular types of interlocutors. Namely, those who firstly need to gain temperance (σωφροσύνη)<sup>30</sup> and self-control (ἐγκράτεια),<sup>31</sup> which are necessary preconditions for approximating virtue (ἀρετή). Timmerman and Schiappa (2010, p. 30) point out that Xenophon sometimes explicitly connects διαλέγεσθαι with a state of deciding.<sup>32</sup> It thus requires an expression of one's own opinion in a discourse with other participants so that it can be tested in discussion. This is precisely the broadest meaning of διαλέγεσθαι that can be found in Xenophon's texts and most accurately describes Socrates' activity of leading the discussion back to its root proposition in cases where a contradiction may potentially occur. Even though some historians of philosophy have held the view that in Xenophon's text Socrates does not use dialectic at all,<sup>33</sup> in *Memorabilia* a few passages can be found in which Socrates explicitly uses διαλέγεσθαι in this sense, or we are at least told he does. Xenophon's representation of Socratic διαλέγεσθαι in effect excludes the possibility of contradiction in a conversation led from the examined root proposition. It recalls Antisthenes' indirect representation of Socratic διαλέγεσθαι, which I suppose it is possible to identify in his speech *Odysseus or on Odysseus*. Antisthenes and Xenophon agree on the point that virtue (ἀρετή) is

<sup>28</sup> Morrison (2010, p. 203) suggests that the function of elenchus in *Mem.* 4.2 is very close to that of Plato and is essentially twofold: (1) it serves to awaken a desire for wisdom of any kind relevant for life's conduct; (2) it tests the strength and endurance of this desire by the test of repeated frustration and refutation. cf. *Xen. Mem.* 4.2.31-36.

<sup>29</sup> cf. *Xen. Mem.* 1.4.1-2

<sup>30</sup> See: *Xen. Mem.* 4.3.

<sup>31</sup> cf. *Xen. Mem.* 4.5.

<sup>32</sup> See: *Xen. Cyr.* 6.1.

<sup>33</sup> See: Schleiermacher, 1861, pp. 441-458.; cf. Grote, 1995, pp. 487-491. In: (Irwin, 1995).



teachable for everyone who practices temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) and self-control (*ἐγκράτεια*). They both also hold that it is possible to improve these two attributes of one's character in self-disciplining practice (*ἄσκησις*), and Socratic διαλέγεσθαι is supposed to be the crucial activity of this practice.<sup>34</sup> This is precisely the same pattern that Antisthenes' Odysseus highlights in his speech (=V A 54, §13, SSR; Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως) for his own defense as he turns away the accusations of Aias in front of the jurors and judges; he emphasizes the versatility (*πολυτροπία*) of his own ethos (*ἦθος*) and through artful use of an epithet (*ἐπίθεται*) transforms in his proof of the root proposition Homer's character as the bulwark (*ἔρκος*) of the Achaeans into the one of a "wild boar" which some day may kill itself falling on something because of uncontrolled anger and lack of self-control.

Despite the fact that both of Antisthenes' epideictic speeches lack the form of question-answer, turn-taking dialogue, the presence of the examination of the interlocutor's character is evident. Because of their epideictic character and the very fact that Antisthenes willingly chooses the style of a court speech, only one turn-take occurs, so to speak, because it is possible to read Aias' and Odysseus' speeches as a dialectic pair. Moreover, Antisthenes, like Xenophon, never defined the Socratic διαλέγεσθαι in a sharp distinction to rhetoric as Plato did. This makes Odysseus free to demonstrate that Aias described his character falsely and raised false accusations. He is able to do so also thanks to the requirement of truthful speaking and true use of rhetorical devices.<sup>35</sup> Antisthenes implies here in a manner similar to that of Xenophon, who does not stick to any sharp definition of διαλέγεσθαι in this point. By introducing the element of the forming of one's own ethos (*ἠθοποιήσις*) into his speech, Antisthenes enables Odysseus to point to these false accusations and prove his root proposition – "I have done the army more good than all of you."<sup>36</sup> At the same time the Socratic requirement of truthful speaking or the true use of rhetoric appears.

Socrates claims in Mem. 4.5 that the role of education is to teach self-control, which makes us useful to the others and brings us closer to virtue (*ἀρετή*). This is the same Socratic heritage which also appears in the epideictic speeches of Antisthenes, and it is possible to identify the lack of it as the source of Aias' tragedy.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> In *Mem.* 4.5 Xenophon describes the practice Socrates used to exhort his companions: "I shall now say how he also made his companions more skilled in taking action. For, holding that it is good for continence to be present in one who intends to do anything noble, first he made it visible to his companions that he, most of all human beings, had trained himself; then, when he conversed, he turned his companions most of all toward continence." ; transl. (Bonnette, 1994, pp. 135-136).

<sup>35</sup> cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.

<sup>36</sup> cf. (V A 54, §1, SSR; Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως,) transl. In: (Gagarin, M. – Woodruff, P., 1995, p. 196).

<sup>37</sup> cf. (V A 54, §1, SSR; Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως).

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